PRUITT v. PRUITT: Habitual Residence, Coercive Control, and the Limits of Article 13(b)

In Pruitt v. Pruitt, 2025 ONSC 3405, McVey J. applied the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction to determine whether a toddler allegedly wrongfully removed from Michigan should be returned there.

The judgment offers a clear reaffirmation that habitual residence turns on the totality of a child’s circumstances—not unilateral parental intent—and that Article 13(b)’s “grave risk of harm” defence remains narrow. It also contains a nuanced treatment of coercive control allegations and a thoughtful discussion of international comity and “chasing orders.”

Background

Tony and Sophie Pruitt married in Michigan in September 2021. Sophie, a Canadian citizen, returned to Ontario while pregnant but reconciled with Tony soon after (para. [5]). Their daughter was born in Ontario in June 2022 while Sophie awaited U.S. immigration approval. Tony visited monthly and provided financial support (para. [6]).

Once Sophie received her green card in January 2024, she and the child moved to Michigan. She began full-time work as a dental hygienist while Tony cared for the child during the day (para. [7]). After a brief summer separation, the family reunited in Michigan in August 2024—until Sophie left again in November 2024, telling Tony she was going to the gym but instead crossed into Ontario with the child and did not return (para. [9]).

Tony obtained a Michigan custody order (para. [10]) and applied in Ontario for the child’s return under the Hague Convention (para. [1]).

Issues

The court identified two questions (para. [12]):

1. Was Michigan the child’s habitual residence immediately before November 19, 2024?
2. If so, should the Ontario court decline to order return because of a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation under Article 13(b)?

Justice McVey expressly noted that this inquiry was not a “best interests” analysis—a key reminder that Hague proceedings focus solely on jurisdiction, not parenting outcomes (para. [15]).

Habitual Residence: Shared Intention and the Centre of the Child’s Life

Justice McVey had “no difficulty” concluding Michigan was the child’s habitual residence (para. [13]). Applying Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16 and Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680, his Honor emphasized the “center of the child’s life,” considering family and social environment immediately before she was removed or retained (paras. [14]–[15]).

The family had lived together in Michigan since January 2024. The child was enrolled in daycare, held U.S. identification, and had strong connections with her paternal grandmother and half-siblings (para. [16]). Both parents had always intended to raise her in Michigan—a shared intention confirmed by the mother’s own counsel (para. [17]).

The court distinguished Parmar v. Flora, 2022 ONCA 869, and J.M. v. I.L., 2020 NBCA 14, in two important ways: first, in those cases, the mother was the sole caregiver. Here, both parents cohabited and shared childcare responsibilities. Secondly, in contrast to Parmar and J.M., both parties clearly and consistently agreed on where to raise their child, and this intention was longstanding and unwavering. (paras. [28]–[30]).

Justice McVey rejected the suggestion that a primary caregiver’s location alone could determine habitual residence:

“If an infant’s habitual residence is driven almost exclusively by the primary caregiver’s location, it would permit that caregiver to move the child at will… contrary to the aims of the Convention.” (para. [25])

Justice McVey concluded that, despite the child’s meaningful early ties to Ottawa, her home—“in every sense of the word”—was Michigan immediately before removal (para. [31]).

Chasing Orders and International Comity

McVey J. acknowledged that the May 2025 Michigan “chasing order”—which declared Michigan the child’s habitual residence—could, in principle, support a Hague Convention application under the principles of international comity. However, he noted the Respondent’s argument that the Michigan court’s analysis focused on “home state” status under domestic law rather than the Convention’s habitual-residence test, and that its written reasons were not available. In the end, McVey J. found it unnecessary to resolve the issue, concluding that his own finding—that Michigan was the child’s habitual residence immediately before removal—was reached independently of the chasing order (paras. [32]–[33]).

This measured approach will interest practitioners: Ontario courts may consider foreign findings on habitual residence but will undertake an independent assessment under the Convention’s hybrid test.

Grave Risk of Harm and Coercive Control Allegations

The Respondent alleged that her marriage was marked by family violence and coercive control, claiming that the Applicant had forced her out of the family home, impliedly threatened her life, monitored her communications, restricted her movements, and created an unsafe and toxic environment (para. [35]). She asserted that returning the child to Michigan would expose both her and the child to grave risk.

Justice McVey accepted that there was ongoing conflict between the parties and that the Respondent had raised concerns about the relationship before these proceedings (para. [36]). However, he found that the Respondent had overstated the Applicant’s alleged abusive behaviour and that much of the evidence directly contradicted her claims (paras. [37]–[42]). For example, text messages showed the Applicant preparing food for the child, encouraging the Respondent to go out and enjoy herself, and supporting her employment choices (paras. [38], [40]). Allegations of financial control were disproven by evidence that the Respondent had independent access to more than $200,000 in assets and was not required to cover medical costs for the child (paras. [41]–[42]).

The court also noted that the Applicant had successfully co-parented two other children on a 50:50 basis for nearly a decade, which weighed against the claim that he was an unfit or unsafe parent (para. [43]). While acknowledging that the parties argued and that the Applicant likely raised his voice, McVey J. characterized these as typical marital conflicts, not proof of coercive or violent conduct (para. [44]).

Importantly, the court expressly recognized that coercive control is “a deeply harmful form of abuse … [that] deserves careful recognition,” but cautioned that not every unhappy or argumentative relationship amounts to coercive or abusive behaviour, particularly in the context of Hague proceedings where evidentiary thresholds are high (para. [45]).

Justice McVey concluded that it was unnecessary to determine whether the relationship met Ontario’s statutory definition of “family violence,” since his task was limited to assessing whether returning the child would expose her to a “grave risk” of harm (para. [46]). On the evidence, that standard was not met. The alleged conduct was not severe, the parties would be living apart upon return, and there was no indication that Michigan courts could not manage safety concerns through appropriate orders (para. [47]).

Immigration Status and Protective Undertakings

McVey J. considered the mother’s immigration status crucial. Her green card was valid until January 2026, and there was no evidence that returning to the United States would automatically jeopardize it (para. [51]). This finding underpinned the court’s view that she could safely return and participate in Michigan proceedings.

To further safeguard the respondent, the court imposed undertakings (paras. [52]–[53]):

• $3,000 CAD monthly support pending Michigan proceedings;
• Suspension of the Michigan custody order;
• Adjournment of Michigan hearing dates to permit her to obtain counsel.

These assurances mitigated both financial and procedural risks while upholding the Convention’s requirement of prompt return.

Key Takeaways for Ontario Practitioners

1. Habitual residence is a child-centred inquiry. Parental caregiving roles are relevant but not determinative (Balev, para. 44; Pruitt, paras. [25], [31]).
2. Comity without deference: Foreign “chasing orders” may inform but do not control the analysis (paras. [32]–[33]).
3. Coercive control is serious but distinct from ordinary conflict. Courts must recognize its harm while maintaining evidentiary discipline (para. [45]).
4. Credibility findings hinge on contradiction, not absence. The court found the mother’s claims “overstated” and contradicted, not merely unproven (paras. [37]–[42]).
5. Immigration realities matter. Valid residency documents may neutralize practical barriers to return (para. [51]).
6. Article 13(b) remains exceptional. Ordinary marital discord does not satisfy the “grave risk” threshold (paras. [46]–[47]).
7. Scope caution: Hague applications do not engage best-interests determinations (para. [15]).

Conclusion

Pruitt v. Pruitt provides a careful and disciplined application of Balev’s hybrid habitual-residence framework and a balanced evaluation of coercive-control allegations under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention. Justice McVey recognized that coercive control is a deeply harmful form of abuse deserving careful recognition, but found that the conduct proven in this case was not sufficiently severe to meet the “grave risk” threshold. His reasons reaffirm that Ontario courts will not conflate ordinary marital conflict with grave risk, nor permit unilateral removals to redefine a child’s habitual residence.

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